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ABSTRACT 
SEVESO plants are installations with a risk of major accidents. They must provide safety reports to 
public authorities and inspection services in order to demonstrate their capability to manage risk 
and, in such reports, risk assessment is at the heart of these documents. The complexity of these 
sociotechnical systems makes it appropriate to support the formulation of this risk assessment with a 
model of the system. However, more often than not, this step is partially treated, simplified or 
avoided. At the same time, investigations have shown that the complexity of industrial systems is 
frequently a factor in accidents.  
In order to handle both this complexity and changes in the system over time, this paper proposes an 
orginal risk analysis method based on the system dynamics theory developed by Forrester in the 
early 1960s. The methodology supports the development of a Dynamic Risk Assessment 
Framework dedicated to industrial activities. It consists of ten complementary steps grouped into 
two main activities: System Dynamics Modelling of the sociotechnical system and Risk Analysis. 
This System Dynamics Risk Analysis is applied to a case study on a chemical plant and provides a 
mean to assess the technological and organizational components of safety. 
 
Keywords: system dynamics; risk assessment; sociotechnical system 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In Europe, management of industrial risk is based on the identification and prioritization of hazards. 
The aim is prevention, protection and safety; through organizational, technical and human means. 
Companies where there is risk of a major accident have an administrative duty to carry out a risk 
assessment of their activities and any hazardous materials used, produced or stored. Particularly 
complex industrial facilities should be frequently assessed using methods such as the Preliminary 
Risk Analysis (PRA) or the Fault Tree Method of Cause and Consequences, also known as the 
'bowtie' method [1]. These modelling methods use diagrams to represent functions and relations 
between elements of an industrial system. However, they do not allow any kind of dynamic 
simulation; in most cases they do no more than represent workflow in a linear fashion. The results 
of the assessment are then applied to the formalization of accident scenarios that decision makers 
use as input to the formulation of the company’s safety measures. 
  
The aim of this paper is to propose an original approach to risk analysis in industry. It uses dynamic 
modelling to simulate activity, both in normal and degraded mode. It does not aim to conduct a 
detailed analysis of the prevention and protection means in an industrial system, but rather presents 
a framework for industrial safety reasoning. This modelling approach is based on system concepts, 
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particularly those of ‘system dynamics’ identified by Forrester in the early 1960s [2]. Its application, 
using prevention and risk management reasoning, leads to the definition of a ‘dynamic risk analysis’ 
approach. 
 
This article discusses the contribution of system concepts, in particular system dynamics, to 
industrial safety using a concrete example. It identifies the various steps involved in building a 
dynamic model of an industrial unit, and presents the results of behaviour simulations in normal 
mode and at the onset of failure. In conclusion it addresses the limitations and benefits of the 
approach and discusses potential improvements. 
 
2. SYSTEM CONCEPTS RELATED TO SAFETY IN THE PROCESS INDUSTRIES  
This section discusses the contribution of system concepts and modelling processes of human 
activities as inputs for risk analysis. It also describes the proposed implementation of the dynamic 
risk analysis method. 
 
2.1. Systems, models and systems’ models 
Of all the keywords used for human activities and more precisely, industrial activities, the term 
‘system’ holds pride of place. According to [3] a system is at the same time: 
 
 a set in relation to its environment, and the interactions that make it autonomous; 
 a set composed of interacting subsystems, and the interdependence that makes it coherent; 
 a set submitted to more or less significant alterations over time, while keeping the same 
permanence. 
 
The concept of the system is inseparable from the concept of the model, which is itself a 
representation of a concrete system. Any real system will only be known through its model. 
Conversely, a model may be considered as a specific system i.e. a system model.  
 
Industrial processes are complex and comprise various components that interact at different levels 
and can provoke unexpected phenomena. Complex system is a “system composed of many parts 
that interact with and adapt each other. In most cases, the behavior of such systems cannot be 
adequately understood by only studying their component parts. This is because the behavior of such 
systems arises through the interactions among those parts”[4]. They generate hazardous situations 
due to technical, human or organisational failure or deviation like the investigation of famous 
accidents in the industries shown [5,6]. 
These phenomena occur in multiple space scales, as well as time scales. In order to understand risks 
due to these industrial activities, various phenomena must be simultaneously taken into account [7]. 
Some phenomena can be simulated with the help of classical modelling forms (mathematical, 
statistical, probabilities, system dynamics etc.). Others require specialist knowledge, (to identify 
human or organisational deviations etc.). In both cases, knowledge of the concerned phenomena 
must be taken into account. Consequently, the system can be modelled in many ways, which are 
more or less comprehensive, and emphasise all or part of the facts. These models differ in: 
 
 which property of the system they highlight; 
 which areas they identify as important; 
 the extent to which they use formalised languages. 
 
This observation makes the concept of systems’ models a useful tool in understanding the 
complexity of industrial activities. On the one hand they provide a way to organise the data and on 




Given this context, this paper aims to use the concept of systems’ models to structure a dynamic risk 
assessment framework related to industrial activities.  
 
2.2. Basic principles of system dynamics  
Complex industrial systems must first be modelled before risk assessment methods, such as the 
Preliminary Risk Analysis (PRA) or the bow-tie analysis [1] can be applied. These methods usually 
show the functions and the relations between the components of an industrial system through 
appropriate diagrams [8]. However, they do not simulate its behaviour in a dynamic way.  
This paper discusses the contribution of a dynamic modelling methodology applied to a chlorine 
(Cl2) transfer unit for plastics synthesis. The aim is to assess the efficiency of prevention and 
protection means implemented at the site. The approach uses the system dynamics concept to model 
and simulate the processes that change or maintain the status, information, matter or energy of the 
system. 
 
[2] defines ‘system dynamics’ as “a way of studying the behaviour of industrial systems to show 
how policies, decisions, structure, and delays are interrelated to influence growth and stability”. He 
describes in detail the procedure that should be followed in order to build a system dynamics model, 
which is based on the following five main steps: 
 
 Identify variables that continuously describe the state of interacting system elements. 
 Define the assumptions that underlie interactions with a view to formalizing the proposed 
system. This enables it to be distinguished from its environment. 
 Develop a model of causal relationships between variables using knowledge and 
assumptions. Identify feedback loops. 
 Using a top-down approach, identify the causative factors. This is to capture an appropriate 
level of complexity which enables consideration of the possible consequences of these 
factors on the dynamic evolution of the system. 
 Describe the relations established in the form of differential equations using simulation 
software. 
 
System dynamics involves the study, modelling and simulation of phenomena that create a change 
in, or the maintenance of the state of a system (natural or artificial) over time. This change, or 
maintenance of the state of the system can be seen when it is possible to model it using ordinal or 
numerical values as indicators. The purpose of applying system dynamics to industrial safety is to 
provide a formal framework for decision support. This support benefits companies dedicated to the 
implementation of prevention and protection measures for workers, facilities, local populations and 
the environment. 
 
At this stage it is appropriate to mention the work done by Nancy Leveson and her team in the 
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT (the Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
Leveson developed an accident model based both on systems and control theory: the STAMP model 
(Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Process). Unlike traditional accident models that consider 
accidents as the result of a faulty chain of events, the STAMP model adopts a systems-based 
approach [9-15]. Industrial systems that embrace the STAMP method adopt a dynamic process in 
which they continuously adapt to internal and external changes to achieve their goals. Safety, an 
emergent property of the system, is seen as a control problem, and the goal is to strengthen safety 
constraints. 
 
Other studies have used system dynamics principles to analyse the dynamics behind industrial 
accidents. [16] examines the causal structure of the Westray mining system by integrating the 
conditions that caused the explosion at the mine in 1992. [6] presents a model of the relationships 
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between managerial, organizational and functional factors of a system, using a causal diagram 
which is applied to the analysis of the Piper Alpha accident in 1988. [17] present a dynamic model 
to evaluate human and organizational factors that contribute to safety in a nuclear power plant. [18, 
19] propose a system dynamics model, which focuses on technical dimensions, to improve risk 
analysis in the context of Seveso industries. Other studies that have focused on analysing the 
reliability of technical systems using system dynamics include the work of [20], which uses system 
dynamics to analyse the dynamic reliability of a nuclear power plant and to assess the limitations of 
its operation. 
 
2.3. System Dynamics Risk Analysis:  the proposed framework 
The proposed approach, defined as a System Dynamics Risk Analysis [18, 19] is based on the 
following ten steps (see figure 1), which are grouped into two main activities (Risk Analysis and 
System Dynamics Modelling). The aim is to ensure continuous improvement in risk management at 
an industrial site. 
 
Figure 1: Architecture and components of the Dynamic Risk Analysis Framework 
 
Step 1: Sociotechnical system modelling. This step is based on the four tasks defined by 
Forrester for the study of system dynamics: 
 Identification of variables to represent the state of system components in interaction 
using data that describes the sociotechnical system (safety reports, piping & 
instrumentation diagrams, procedures etc.). 
 Definition of the assumptions that underlie the interactions in order to formalize the 
proposed system. 
 Development of a causal model of relations between the variables. 
 Description of the relations using differential equations, and their implementation in 
software (the STELLA® modelling platform [21]).  
Step 2: Simulation of the normal operation of the system. This step aims to simulate the 
behaviour of the system assuming that no failure can occur. The aim is to create a reference 
model which reflects the ideal functioning of the system. This provides a first decision support 
for experts. 
Step 3: Identification of failures. This step involves the identification of possible failures in 
the system (technical, human or organisational). It is based on classical risk assessment methods 
such as HAZOP [1].  
Step 4: Modelling of failures. This step involves implementing, in the reference model, the 
various failures identified, from the point of view of the general behaviour of the system and its 
components. It is based on the modelling methodology proposed by Forrester and uses the 
modelling platform to integrate failures 
Step 5: Simulation of abnormal operation. Once the various types of failures have been 
implemented in the modelling platform, the behaviour of the system in degraded (in safety 
terms) mode can be studied. The results of these simulations of system behaviour enable 
understanding of the evolving consequences of failures, in the context of the general behaviour 
of the system and its components. 
Step 6: Simulation of hazardous phenomena. The results of the simulation provide 
information on system behaviour, over time, during a failure. The consequences of these failures 
can be simulated with software. This estimates the impact of hazards (e.g. overpressure, heat 
flows, and the release of toxic pollutants) on plant personnel, the local population, buildings and 
the natural environment for example. Distances and dangers are estimated using biophysical 
vulnerability thresholds for each hazard identified. 
Step 7: Definition of prevention, protection and intervention means. The information 
provided by the simulation of the system in degraded mode, and of the consequences provides 
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the material for the identification of human, technical and organizational means for prevention, 
protection and safeguarding. These means are identified using risk analysis reasoning (based on 
the HAZOP approach) applied to our case study. 
Step 8: Modelling of prevention, protection and intervention means.  The safety means 
identified by the risk analysis are implemented in the model using the dynamic modelling 
procedure. 
Step 9: Simulation of prevention, protection and intervention means. The safety means 
implemented in the modelling platform are used in simulations of the behaviour of the system. 
This is to test their effectiveness in various failure scenarios. 
Step 10: Performance assessment of safety means. Simulations of system behaviour enable 
the study of the behaviour of safety devices over time. This step helps to understand the role of 
safety means and assess their performance based on the failure scenarios previously identified 
and modelled. Depending on the simulation results, it may be necessary to return to Step 7 to 
redefine safety means that are not sufficiently efficient. 
 
The interrelations between the described models and approaches made it relevant to implement 
them in a framework. The framework gives a more comprehensive and integrated oversight of the 
organization of risk assessment and management activities, and can be used as a decision support 
system for risk prevention in the process industries. It is composed of models, tools and procedures 
which will be described in the following sections. The ultimate goal of this framework is to provide 
decision-makers with a method to assess safety performance, in order to support their choices on the 
strategy used to implement safety means.  
 
 
The next section introduces the case study and the steps and models used to assess the efficiency of 
safety means. The results are presented in Section 4 and discussed in Section 5. 
 
3. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the application of the framework’s methodology and tools to the case study; a 
chlorine transfer unit. It describes the industrial site, its environment, the unit itself, and the 
methodology for modelling the normal operation of this unit. Existing safety devices are described 
and their efficiency is tested through simulation of the functioning of the system as a whole. 
 
3.1. The chlorine transfer unit  
Chlorine gas is heavier than air (3.2 g/l at 0 ºC) and tends to form a cloud at ground level. Its odour 
is suffocating and pungent at a concentration of less than 1ppm [22]. The effects of chlorine on 
human health are linked to its irritant properties; at an atmospheric concentration less than 15ppm, it 
irritates the eyes, the skin and the respiratory system cells. Longer exposure at higher concentrations 
(around 1,000 ppm) can cause a pulmonary oedema after a few minutes and causes the death of the 
contaminated person. 
  
The industrial site is surrounded by a relatively dense population (more than 6,000 residents in a 1 
km radius), near a highway (150m), and a railway (20m). Various economic and leisure facilities 
(supermarkets, businesses and a cinema etc.) are located within a 2km radius.  
 
One of the activities at the industrial site is a chlorine transfer unit. Hazardous activities centre on 
this unit which dispatches chlorine to a plastics production unit. The transfer unit is composed of 
three subunits (Figure 2): 
 
- The tank unit which provides a continuous flow of chlorine to the chlorine line via two 
tanks transported by rail. 
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- The chlorine line which maintains the flow of chlorine according to the demands of the 
plastics production unit. 
- The heat production unit which controls the physical conditions of the system. This 
consists of two boilers that regulate temperature in order to maintain the chlorine in a 
gaseous state. The two boilers are connected at the level of the evaporator and the 
superheater. The heat production unit receives information about chlorine formation from 
sensors on the chlorine line. 
 
Figure 2: The chlorine transfer unit (W=Wagon; SV=Security valve; RV=Regulation valve; PC=Pressure sensor; 
P=Pump) 
 
When it arrives at the site, the wagon transporting the chlorine tank is directed into an airtight 
bunker, sufficiently ventilated to create a slight vacuum. Connection, disconnection and draining of 
the chlorine tank are carried out in this enclosed space and chlorine leakage detectors continuously 
analyse the quality of the air. If there is a release of chlorine gas at a concentration of more than 
5ppm, it is sucked out and directed towards a neutralisation column containing soda ash (not shown 
in Figure 2).  
 
The air temperature in the bunker is maintained at 35°C by the heat production unit. At this 
temperature the internal pressure of the tank can be increased to 8-9 bars. At this pressure, the 
chlorine becomes liquid and it can be piped. This method allows the chlorine to be tapped and does 
not introduce inert gasses. It takes approximately 3-4 days to empty a tank, depending on 
consumption. The tank is replaced when pressure in the line drops; this indicates that the tank is 
almost empty. The process of switching from an empty tank to a full one takes approximately an 
hour and a half.  
 
When a new tank enters the bunker it is first stabilized, then connected to a 25mm pipe which pipes 
the liquid chlorine towards the evaporator. The evaporator turns the liquid chlorine into a gas. It is 
situated in a building adjacent to the bunker. This building also houses a superheater.  A regulation 
valve at the evaporator inflow ensures a constant flow of liquid chlorine. The liquid chlorine 
arriving from the tank enters the evaporator at 35ºC and is turned into a gas. The superheater then 
increases its temperature to 40ºC to compensate for the loss of heat in the production unit supply 
pipe, which could cause condensation. Both the evaporator and the superheater use warm water 
which circulates through a closed circuit and which is heated by means of a vapour exchanger. The 
warm water circuit is controlled by the water steam output. The water temperature (normally 36ºC) 
on the outlet side of the evaporator is controlled by the steam valve.  
 
An entry valve is set at the superheater. This guarantees a pressure of 2.5 bars when the chlorine 
arrives at the plastics production unit. Other safety valves (completely opened or closed, ‘all or 
nothing’ valves) are placed along the chlorine line and are activated in response to changes in 
pressure, alarms indicating leakage, or other safety sensors. In this way, control and safety functions 
of the system are separated.  
 
The causality relations between these three sub-systems and their components are shown in the 
following causal graphs (Figures 3 and 4). 
 
3.2. Description of the causal graphs  
The system dynamics modelling approach uses the three elements described above to form the basis 
for the model. The relationship between these three elements is evaluated using information about 
the organisation of the industrial site: 
- The tank unit provides the chlorine line with chlorine, at a rate guaranteed by its internal 
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organisation (two tanks alternately filled and emptied, with safety precautions appropriate to 
this delicate operation). 
- The chlorine line provides information to the tank unit about downstream production needs. 
This maintains a relatively constant flow of chlorine. 
- The heat production unit regulates the physical conditions of this exchange. It consists of a 
heat exchanger which regulates the temperature in order to maintain the chlorine in a stable 
gaseous state. The exchange takes place at the level of the evaporator and the superheater. 
The heat production unit therefore, in turn, receives information about the state of the 
chlorine in the chlorine line. 
 
A high-level aggregated causal graph can therefore be established (Figure 3). Each arrow indicates 
the nature of the causal relationship. The tank unit supplies chlorine to the chlorine line. In this 
sense it tends to increase the presence of chlorine (+). However, supply is regulated because of the 
need for a steady flow of chlorine in the line. This creates the need to restrict supply to a defined 
level (-). 
 
The chlorine line interacts with the heat production unit in the same way. The heat production unit 
tends to increase the flow of chlorine in the line (+). The line responds with data that regulates heat 
production to a level which creates a regular flow (-). A control station receives information about 
the chlorine line and the heat production unit and manages the safe emptying of the tanks and an 
appropriate chlorine flow rate. There is also a causal relationship between the heat production unit 
and the tank unit, which are linked by data (+). This link is not directly symmetrical: the heat 
production unit must only ensure that the chlorine remains in a gaseous state. It does not affect the 
flow of chlorine in the chlorine line. Therefore there is no causal arrow between the tank unit and 
the heat production unit. 
 
 
Figure 3: High-level aggregate causal graph of the unloading and transfer of chlorine 
 
Therefore, it can be seen that the system has at this very general level, three interacting control loops 
which ensure the overall safe delivery of chlorine to the plastics production unit. This simplified and 
aggregated description of the system forms the basis for the model, implemented using variables 
that can be quantified and correlated using the relations shown in these feedback loops. 
 
Figure 4 (the detailed causal graph) shows all the variables used in the model and their causal 
relationships. This figure does not show other parameters, such as constants, which may appear in 
the stock-flow diagram. Constants are not involved in a feedback loop as causal elements; instead 
they are used in the simulation equations. The detailed causal graph enables a qualitative evaluation 
of the relations between elements of the system being modelled, and identification of those relations 
that can be expressed numerically. 
 
Once the detailed causal graph has been established, the description of the elements and the rela-
tions between them can then be translated into a stock-flow diagram. The symbols used by Forrester 
and the creation of mathematical formulae (such as differential equations, functions or parameters) 
enable the description and validation of the choice of variables. The following sections elaborate on 
the description of these variables for the three main areas: the tank unit, the chlorine line and the 
heat production unit. 
 





3.3. Software implementation of the model 
 
STELLA® software [21] was used to implement and simulate the model both in normal operation 
and in in the case of failure (e.g. a leak caused by the rupture of a pipeline). The user works in an 
environment consisting of three windows (interface, diagrams and equations) which enable the 
design of a model in various degrees of detail. The software is based on the principle of natural 
systems which seeks to describe systems in terms of their own structures (identification and linking 
of sub-systems) rather than from their initial state. Once the model is constructed, the software can 
provide graphical stock-flow diagram simulations (Figure 5) which identifies components according 
to their causal interactions.  
 
Prevention (atmospheric chlorine sensors, alarms etc.) and protection (valves etc.) components are 
modelled using the same logic in order to check their relevance. Because of the complexity of the 
system, not all of the modelled components and variables are shown. 
 
Figure 5: STELLA® modelling of stock, flow and converter variables. 
 
Figure 6 models the chlorine discharge system starting from the tank unit. This figure shows the 
relations between the various stock, flow and control variables. 
 
Figure 6: STELLA® modelling of the chlorine tank transfer unit 
 
Table 1 describes a selection of the variables and their implementation used in the model. 
 
Table 1: Definition and role of a selection of variables used to model the tank transfer unit. 
 
The next section highlights the results relating to the operations of the unit. 
 
4. SIMULATION OF THE CHLORINE TRANSFER UNIT IN NORMAL AND 
ABNORMAL SITUATIONS 
 
The STELLA® simulation of the operation of the unit is controlled by graphs representing the state 
of variables over time. This simulation is first run in normal mode, which provides a reference 
model describing the ideal operation of the unit. This is followed by a HAZOP (HAZard and 
OPerability) risk analysis of the entire industrial system. Any shortcomings identified are 
implemented in the software, along with the proposed prevention and protection means. The aim is 
to evaluate consistency and performance. 
 
4.1. Simulation of the system in normal mode 
The time-frame for the case study is defined arbitrarily as 400 hours (just over 16 days). Figure 7 
shows the variation in the quantity of chlorine in the tanks at the transfer units. Two types of 
variation are observed. The first relates to the quantity of chlorine discharged which is either 55 or 
59 tonnes. This is accounted for by the difference in capacity between the two tanks. The second 
variation relates to the discharge time which varies according to the quantity of chlorine delivered 
and the requirements of the plastics production unit. The figure shows that chlorine tank 1 takes 90 
hours to discharge, and tank 2 takes approximately 100 hours.  
 
Figure 7: Simulation of chlorine tank discharge. 1=chlorine tank 1; 2=chlorine tank 2. The x-axis represents time in 
hours (0-400). The y-axis measures the quantity of chlorine in the tank (0-60,000kg) 
 
Figure 8 shows chlorine flow through regulation valve 1 (1) which is located at the point where 
chlorine is discharged from the tank in bunker 1. The flow varies according to the needs of the 
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plastics production unit. The chlorine flow through the collector (2) varies in the same proportions 
as it collects liquid chlorine leaving the bunker to send to the evaporator. 
 
Figure 8: Simulation of liquid chlorine transfer from bunker 1 into the chlorine line for transformation into gas. The 
x=axis represents time in hours (0-400). 1=Regulation valve 1 where the liquid chlorine flow ranges from 400 to 700 
kg/h. 2=Collector where liquid chlorine flow ranges from 400 to 1000 kg/h. 
 
4.2. Risk assessment of the industrial system 
The software model of the discharge and delivery of chlorine shown above represents the normal 
operation of the system. It forms a reference model from which it is possible to study failure modes. 
In our example, the identification of system failures is based on the HAZOP (HAZard and 
OPerability) method which is applied to the transfer unit.  
 
The implementation of the HAZOP method [1] consists of the following phases: 
 
1. Decompose the process or system according to nodes that correspond to a particular stage of 
the process. In the case in question, three nodes were identified: the tank unit, the chlorine 
line and heat production unit. 
2. Identify the component involved (chlorine tank, safety valve, etc.). 
3. Define the parameter of interest within the component (temperature, pressure, flow etc.) and 
identify its possible failures using a relevant keyword (flow too high or too low, pressure too 
high or low, early or late operation etc.). 
4. Investigate the possible causes of failure (broken water mains, power-cut etc.). 
5. Define possible preventive barriers to prevent or lessen the probability of the cause of failure 
(modify equipment or processes, establish preventive maintenance procedures etc.). 
6. Investigate the effects and grade the severity of the event based upon its impact on health, 
the environment and operations. 
7. Suggest protective barriers to prevent or limit the impact on vulnerable areas. 
Table 2 is a brief example of the analysis. 
 
Table 2: An example of failure analysis in the event of a chlorine leak. Items in bold show the prevention and protection 
barriers that have been modelled and whose influence on the system behaviour has been studied. 
 
The next section shows the results of a simulation which integrates the safety devices (prevention 
and protection barriers) activated by a failure. These results underline the efficiency of the accident 
prevention means that are implemented. 
 
4.3. Implementation and simulation of safety devices in a failure scenario 
The proposed failure scenario is a broken pipe at the end of the chlorine line as it enters the plastics 
production unit. As a first level of accident prevention and protection, the following safety devices 
were added into the model: 
- An alert system which is activated when the chlorine flow into the plastics production unit 
is either 90% lower or 10% higher than the required flow. This alert system is connected to 
safety valves that are automatically closed when the alert system is triggered. This stops the 
flow of chlorine. 
- Atmospheric sensors placed in the bunkers which detect chlorine gas emission in a 
confined environment. These sensors are connected to the alert system and their activation 
also triggers the valve system. 
- An alarm which is activated by the alert system. The purpose of this alarm is to warn 
operators that there is an incident.   
 
Figure 9 shows the two chlorine tanks, which normally provide a continuous flow of chlorine to the 
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production unit at a rate of about 600 kg/h. Each tank holds around 55-59 tonnes of chlorine. It 
normally takes 72-96 hours to empty a tank depending on demand from the production unit.  
 
In this scenario, the pipeline ruptures at t=200 hours. It causes an event that is detected by the 
system. A decrease in the flow of chlorine into the production unit activates the alert system. 
Activation of the alert system then triggers the immediate shut-down of safety valves 1 and 2 in the 
transfer unit.  
 
 
Figure 9: Shutdown of the chlorine tanks following alert activation at t=200 hours. 
 
The interruption continues throughout the remainder of the simulation as it requires major repairs 
taking more than 200 hours. The consequence of this decision is no more chlorine flowing to the 
collector and regulation valve 1 (Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10: Chlorine flow in the collector (2) and regulation valve 1 (1) in normal mode, and after shutdown at t=200 
hours. 
 
Figure 11 shows the software representation of the safety means and the failure. 
 
Figure 11: Software modelling of chlorine leakage (A) and safety measures (B) 
 
Table 3 defines the variables used to model the chlorine leakage and the alert methods. 
 
Table 3: Modelling prevention and protection barriers 
 
This simulation of the behaviour of the system during a pipeline break highlights the role of 
prevention and protection barriers. Their activation allows the system to be quickly secured by 
closing the safety valves, which stops chlorine flowing into the atmosphere. In the simulation, it 
takes less than 1 minute to activate the safety valves. In this time, an ALOHA software simulation 
of atmospheric releases [23] estimates the formation of a toxic cloud which covers a 20m radius at a 
concentration of 910ppm (corresponding to a death rate of 1% for each minute of exposure). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The approach shown here brings together methods and tools to achieve a System Dynamics Risk 
Analysis of an industrial system, represented here by a chlorine transfer unit. The methodology used 
is based on dynamic modelling of the system. It uses software to simulate the behaviour of the sys-
tem in normal operation and when failures occur. 
 
The limitations of this approach are essentially linked to the desired degree of complexity, which 
affects the time needed to develop the model, define the variables, run the simulation and interpret 
the results.  
 
The benefits of this approach are relevant both for industry and government departments responsible 
for monitoring high-risk installations. Its main contribution involves system simulation in various 
failure scenarios. This functionality enables the real-time evaluation of the consequences of failures 
for personnel, local populations or the environment. When coupled with a tool to estimate the 
impact of atmospheric toxic releases, dynamic modelling can demonstrate the physical 
consequences of events, e.g. the amount of hazardous materials released over a certain time, 
reaction times and measures for protecting operators. Further work on the representation of 
technical systems (the chlorine transfer network, alarms, sensors etc.) will make it possible to model 
11 
 
the human and organizational aspects related to activities, as well as prevention and protection 
efforts. These efforts include measures such as the implementation of maintenance and repair 
operations or the role of operators. It follows that the application of this systemic approach to 
modelling provides support for the definition of an integrated and dynamic risk management 
strategy. 
Furthermore, the use of a software platform to model dynamic systems enables the behaviour of the 
system (and its sub-systems) to be both represented and simulated. It is also very easy to implement 
changes to the model and to test them to validate their relevance. Changes can be introduced either 
in the design or operation phase. For example when the hazard analysis is updated, when there is a 
technical or organisational change in system, or when safety plans are formalised. The system 
dynamics modelling approach therefore forms part of a continuous improvement strategy for the 
prevention and management of industrial risks. 
System dynamics risk analysis identifies prevention and protection means that respond to accident 
scenarios. The implementation and simulation of these means within the model enables the study of 
their behaviour as the event unfolds. Dynamic modelling then provides a way for experts to evaluate 
the potential effectiveness of means to be integrated into the system. Specifically, it is a way of 
validating the effectiveness of barriers before their incorporation in situ. 
Moreover, the effort that experts must make to create a model of the system requires them to deepen 
their knowledge of the industrial process. They must identify the elements to be modelled, define 
and set variables and run simulations to check consistency with the existing system (or, in the case 
of the development of a new system, expectations). All of these tasks provide a perspective on the 
system that complements a classical ‘process engineering’ vision. The approach demands that 
system functions and behaviour be considered from another angle, while still making use of process 
engineering expertise. 
The approach also represents a formal support for communication and training. This is primarily 
due to the simple representation of the variables (stocks, flows, and auxiliary variables) and the 
graphical representation of results. It becomes relatively easy for the modeller to explain to 
company employees, consultants or government agencies the behaviour of the system and the role 
of safety barriers in the occurrence of failure, using scenarios defined in the risk assessment. This 
same material can also be used to create expert groups interested in the conduct or evaluation of 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1: Definition and role of a selection of variables used to model the tank transfer unit. 
Variable name Definition Function 
wagon_1 availability 
IF (chlorine_tank_1 < permutation_threshold_of_the_wagon) THEN 
(quantity_to_deliver_bunker_1) ELSE 0 
Chlorine available in transfer tanks 
chlorine_tank_1 55000 or 59000 Capacity of the transfer tank 
safety_valve_1 
IF (control_cabin==1) THEN  
IF (gas_chlorine_evaporator > 2000) THEN 0 ELSE (production_flow) 
ELSE 0 
Simulates the chlorine flow towards the collector 
Collector Stock Quantity of chlorine leaving safety valves 1 and 2 
permutation_order_1 IF (chlorine_tank_1 <  permutation_ threshold_of_the_wagon) THEN 1 ELSE 0 





Chlorine threshold which activates the change of 
tank 
quantity_to_deliver_bunker_1 DELAY ((permutation_order_1 * wagon_ quantity) , charging_time) Quantity of chlorine to be delivered to bunker 1 
charging_time NORMAL (48,5) Time to change a tank (48 hours +/- 5 hours) 
wagon_quantity RANDOM (55000, 59000,1) 
Quantity of liquid chlorine delivered by the rail 
network (55 - 59 tonnes) 
production_flow Graph 
Production plant chlorine needs (570 - 645 kg per 
hour) 
Control 
IF (production_flow > 700) THEN 1 ELSE 
IF (warm__water_tank < 700 OR warm_water__tank_2 < 700) THEN 1 ELSE  
IF (alert_status==1) THEN 1 ELSE 0 
Controls chlorine flow rate 
control_cabin 
IF (Control==1) THEN 0 ELSE  
IF ((chlorine_tank_1 <  permutation_threshold_ of_the_wagon) AND (chlorine_tank_2 >  
permutation_threshold_of_the_wagon)) THEN 2 ELSE 
IF ((chlorine_tank_1 > permutation_ threshold_of_the_wagon) AND (chlorine_tank_2 < 
permutation_threshold_of_the_wagon)) THEN 1 ELSE  
IF ((chlorine_tank_1 <  permutation_threshold_of_the_wagon) AND (chlorine_tank_2 < 
permutation_threshold_ of_the_wagon)) THEN 0 ELSE  
IF (chlorine_ tank_1 < chlorine_tank_2) THEN 1 ELSE 2 
Selects the tank to be emptied by the successive 
activation of the safety valves 
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Table 2: An example of failure analysis in the event of a chlorine leak. Items in bold show the prevention and protection barriers that have been modelled and whose influence on the 
system behaviour has been studied. 
Node 
 
Component Parameter and 
deviation 
Cause of the 
deviation 
Prevention barrier to 
implement 




Outlet pipe from 





Leak caused by 
badly joined pipes 
Preventive maintenance 






Formation of a toxic 




Closure of safety valves 
 
Automatic halt of the 
installation 
 
Activation of internal 
accident procedures 
Leak caused by 
mishandling 




Formation of a toxic 




Closure of safety valves 
 
Automatic half of the 
installation  
 
Activation of internal 
accident procedures 




Regular monitoring and 
preventive maintenance 
Reduction or temporary 
halt in production 
 
Malfunction of the 
regulatory valves 
Checks of valve opening Reduction or temporary 




Table 3: Modelling prevention and protection barriers 
Variable name  Definition Function 
Leak_part RANDOM (0.1, 0.3) Proportion of chlorine released into 
the atmosphere 
Leak_time RANDOM (1,400) × 0 + 200 When leakage will occur. Here, leak 
time = 200 hours 
Leak_interval Fixed at 72 hours Period which separates two leakages 
in the same part of the system 
Leak_rate PULSE (Leak_part, Leak_time, Leak_interval) Quantity of chlorine released at a 
certain point, and recurring after a 
defined interval between two leaks 
Gas_chlorine_leak Security_valve_3 × Leak_rate Flow of chlorine released 
Alert IF (((Production_input < (Production_flow * 0.90))   
OR (Production_input > (Production_flow * 1.10)))  
THEN 1 ELSE 0 
Activated when the chlorine flow into 
the production plant is either 90% 
less or 10% more than the flow  
required 
Repair_time Graph Non-linearly proportional to the 
proportion of gas released 
Alert_end DELAY (Alert, Repair_time) Time required to end the alert 
Stop_alarm Binary: 0 or 1 Stops the alarm 










Figure 2: The chlorine transfer unit (W=Wagon; SV=Security valve; RV=Regulation valve; PC=Pressure sensor; P=Pump) 
 
 






































Figure 7: Simulation of chlorine tank discharge. 1=chlorine tank 1; 2=chlorine tank 2. The x-axis represents time in 










Figure 8: Simulation of liquid chlorine transfer from bunker 1 into the chlorine line for transformation into gas. The 
x=axis represents time in hours (0-400). 1=Regulation valve 1 where the liquid chlorine flow ranges from 400 to 700 































Figure 11: Software modelling of chlorine leakage (A) and safety measures (B) 
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